Portable jammer. Ministry of General and Vocational Education

COMPLEX OF MEANS OF RADIO COUNTERMEASURES YAK-28PP

The Yak-28PP aircraft could create complex interference with enemy electronic means (RES), since its specialized equipment included both active and passive radio countermeasures (RPD).

Active means included three types of jamming stations, which, in accordance with their purpose, were divided into means of group protection ("Bouquet" and "Beans") and individual protection ("Lilac"). The former made it possible to cover a whole group of aircraft with interference, the latter served for self-defense (or mutual defense of two or more aircraft).

RES are divided into two groups: means of command and control of troops and means of controlling weapons. The former include long-range detection stations, guidance and target designation stations, simple target designation stations, as well as detection and guidance stations. All these radars operate in
view mode, viewing the space either in a circular mode (360 °), or in a certain angular sector. The task of such stations is to detect targets or provide observation of tracking objects and give out their current coordinates. They have wide radiation patterns, so they measure the azimuth, range, and height quite roughly, but at any time they give out the full tactical situation in the observed area on the PPI or tablets.

If the detected target does not respond to the "friend or foe" identification signals and a decision is made to
its destruction, the "relay race" is taken over by means of weapon control. These stations are for
directly for targeting missiles or guns. These include airborne radars for intercepting and aiming fighters, radars for tracking, tracking a target and a missile of anti-aircraft missile systems, homing heads for air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery gun guidance stations and others. Such radars operate in review mode only until
target acquisition, and then go into tracking mode, when they regularly irradiate and regularly measure the coordinates and point the weapon. Measurement of coordinates and guidance is carried out with high accuracy, but only in a limited sector of space.

The Yak-28PP aircraft was specially created to suppress the RES of command and control of troops and communication lines
zi. For this purpose, the group protection stations "Bouquet" and "Fasol" were installed on it.

"Bouquet" is an "open" common name for active electronic interference stations SPS-22, SPS-33, SPS-44 and SPS-55. In fact, this is the same station, but tuned to different frequency ranges. The letters indicated differences in the frequency range: SPS-22 generated interference in the wavelength range of 22-30 cm, SPS-33 - 12.5 - 22 cm, SPS-44 - 10-12.5 cm and SPS-55 - 8-10 cm. For identification according to the carrier aircraft, their names included two more digits: for example, for the Yak-28PP, the full index was SPS-22-28, SPS-33-28, etc., for Tu-16P - SPS-22-16, SPS -33-16 etc. On the whole, a set of SPS stations of various letters made it possible to cover with radio interference the entire spectrum of frequencies used by the "probable enemy" command and control radio electronic equipment in the 60s. All stations were interchangeable: if necessary, it was easy to remove a special container from the aircraft, for example, from SPS-22 and install it in its place from SPS-55, etc.

The ATP station is automatic, although it is called semi-automatic in the technical description. She has
has its own analyzer and jamming transmitters. Each letter has four or six transmitters that cover the radiation pattern of the suppressed radar (one for one sector, the second for the second, etc.). It can create barrage or targeted interference, and the choice is made automatically depending on the electronic situation.

After turning on the SPS, it first analyzes the situation. If radiation from an enemy radar is detected, the analyzer unit determines its operating frequency and power. The transmitters then generate interference at the given frequency with the required power. For a certain time interval (approximately 2.5 - 3 minutes), it emits interference, then stops and analyzes the radar signal again. If the enemy begins to change the frequency of their radars, the SPS automatically monitors these changes and generates interference depending on their mode of operation. An analog analyzer - a logic circuit made on a relay (50s!), Determines how many signals come in a given frequency range and how they are located among themselves. It has several modes of operation that are selected automatically. If, for example, five signals come from five radars, and their frequencies are very different, then it creates five target areas of interference, placing them over the range. If, after the next analysis, it turns out that two or more radars have come close in operating frequency, then they will be “covered” with a common barrage interference, and the remaining ones will be suppressed by aimed interference (after adjusting to their new frequencies).

Depending on the composition of the enemy RES grouping along the flight route and the range of their operating frequencies, one of the SPS stations was installed on the Yak-28PP: SPS-22, SPS-33 or another. For
in order to cover the entire required range, for example, SPS-22 is put on one aircraft, SPS-44 on the other, SPS-55 on the third, and all these three aircraft either fly in combat formations or barrage in zones.

For the late 60s, the SPS was a very good station: it met the requirements for both energy and operational characteristics. In other words, the power of its transmitters was enough to suppress the reflected signals of the enemy’s radar, and the speed made it possible to respond in a timely manner to changes in the electronic situation (that is, if the enemy switched to another operating frequency, the SPS quickly "caught" it and again "hammered" it with interference). But since the beginning of the 70s, the potential enemy had stations that could change their frequency much faster (including in leaps and bounds). The power of their radiation pulses increased, and narrower radiation patterns appeared. Later, a new type of radar was generally created, with phased arrays, which did not scan the entire range, but only the necessary sections, lingering more on them and, accordingly, accumulating the energy of the reflected signal.

Lamp "Bouquets", created in the late 50s and having a fair amount of inertia, began to "late":
while they determined the radiation parameters and created interference, the enemy was already working freely on a different frequency, and there was not enough power to suppress echo signals. Due to the loss of efficiency, they were withdrawn from service, and together with the Yak-28PP and Tu-16P aircraft: in Russia - in 1993, in Ukraine - a year later.

The second group protection station installed on the Yak-28PP is SPS-5-28 letter PP-1, or "Beans". Its saber-shaped transmitting antennas on the lower outer sides of the engine nacelles are typical only for the Yak-28PP and make it easy to visually distinguish it from the numerous “twenty-eighths” mestva.

SPS-5, like its more modern model SPS-5M, is a direct noise jamming station. It is not automatic - either the pilot or the navigator-operator must turn it on. When laying a route, they simply mark the sections where it should work. They fly up to the starting point - they turn on and put noise interference. They fly up to the final one - they turn it off, etc. The station has four interchangeable transmitters (A, B, C and D), which differ in the parameters of the generated radiation. Despite the "age" (it is older than the "Bouquet") and the simplicity of design, "Beans" is still in service.

The stations "Bouquet" and "Fasol" are installed in a special container of the Yak-28PP aircraft.

The "Bouquet" antennas are located in the lower part of the special container and are covered with a common convex radio-transparent fairing.

Yak-28PP fire control radars could only be interfered with in self-defense. For
this he had on board a personal protection station from the Lilac kit.

"Lilac" is the "open" name of the stations simulating electronic interference SPS-141,
SPS-142 and SPS-143. All stations are interchangeable, depending on the nature of the mission, any of them could be installed on the aircraft. The blocks are placed on the starboard side in a niche between frames No. 6 and No. 10, the transmitter is in the bow of the navigator's cabin. The niche was closed with a removable cover, in the lower front part of which there was a very modest air intake: simulating interference generated by this station did not require high power and, accordingly, intensive cooling. Transmitting antennas - in small drop-shaped fairings on the sides of the root part of the HPH rod, receiving - on both sides behind the cockpit.

The station interfered (in range and speed) with both pulsed and Doppler weapons control radars (airborne radars for fighter aircraft sights, guidance stations for air defense systems, missiles and air-to-air missiles with radar seeker). She received an irradiating pulse, automatically determined its parameters and formed a series of similar false response signals with a time delay, which led to a failure of guidance (the mark from the real target was lost among the false ones).

Unguided aircraft missiles were used as passive means of RPD on the Yak-28PP
(NAR) S-5P and reset device "Automatic-211".

Under the plane of the wing of the aircraft on beam holders, two 16-barrel universal launch blocks UB-16-57UM with anti-radar S-5P (PARS-57) caliber 57 mm were installed. A volley of these missiles could instantly create a curtain of passive interference along the flight path in the form of a cloud of thin metallized fibers. Such a curtain was capable of "covering" attack aircraft from enemy surveillance radars for a period of 10 minutes to an hour (depending on altitude and weather conditions). There were no sights on board, so the NAR fired straight ahead: the plane simply gained the desired height or raised its nose.

The S-5P missile was put into service on December 31, 1964. Its weight was 5 kg, length 1.073 m,
flight speed 450-480 m/s. After a certain time after the launch, it alternately threw out three packets with metallized fiberglass dipoles, which, flying apart, formed a curtain. The warhead could be equipped with various types of dipoles. It was later replaced by the upgraded S-5P1 missile.

The device "Automatic-2I" (KDS-19) with two symmetrical beams was installed under the engine nacelles. It was intended to interfere with the radar interception of an aircraft by dropping anti-radar chaff made of metallized fiberglass into
back hemisphere. The reset was carried out manually (by pressing the firing buttons installed on
dual control panel when the circuit breaker "Interference" is on) or automatically by
signals from the Sirena-3 enemy radar radiation warning station. In addition, the ASO-2I device fired special cartridges ("heat traps") that interfered with homing missiles with IR (thermal) seekers.

Ministry of General and Vocational Education

Russian Federation

Samara State Aerospace University

named after academician S. P. Korolev

Department of Microelectronics

Coursework in the discipline:

Principles of engineering creativity.

Direction finder for active jammers.

Student gr. 535 Bogdanov D.S.

Head Shopin G.P.

Samara

course project.

Explanatory note contains 23 pages, 5 figures, 3 sources.

AMPLITUDE DIRECTION FINDER, ACTIVE INTERFERENCE PRODUCER, DETECTOR-INTEGRATOR, OUTPUT SIGNAL PATTERN, DIRECTIONAL DIAGRAM, FALSE ALARMS LEVEL, DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION, CLAIMS OF THE INVENTION, TREE OF OBJECTIVES AND MEANS.

The paper considers the process of making improvements to the design of the direction finder of active jammers. The analysis of the design of the prototype, the search and theoretical solution of the contradiction, the selection of a specific technical solution to eliminate the contradiction were carried out. As a result of the work, a new device has been obtained, which has a higher sensitivity compared to the prototype with a constant level of false alarms.

The course work is designed for students studying in the specialty 210201.

Introduction ................................................ ................................................. .....page 4

1. Description of the work of the prototype ............................................... ......................page 7

2. Claims of the prototype....................................................... ..............page 10

3. Tree of goals and means............................................... ...............................page 11

4. Contradictions. Conflict resolution .................................................................. .p.12

5. Description of the operation of the new device .............................................. .........page 13

6. Claim of invention of a new device .............................................. .p.16

Conclusion................................................. ................................................. page 17

List of used sources .................................................................. ..........page 19

Application................................................. ................................................. page .twenty

Introduction.

Currently, there are many devices for radar, radio navigation and direction finding. They are equipped with modern sea vessels, aircraft, spacecraft, etc., both civil and military. Radar interference can become an obstacle to the operation of such a device. Radar interference (more precisely, anti-radar interference) is intentional interference that impedes or disrupts the normal operation of radar (RL) facilities for military purposes: radar stations (RLS), homing heads of guided missiles or aerial bombs, radio fuses, etc.

Distinguish between active and passive radio interference. Active interference is created by special transceiver or transmitting radio devices - stations or transmitters of radio interference, passive interference - by various artificial reflectors of radio waves. (Passive interference also includes reflections of radio waves from local objects and natural formations that interfere with the operation of the radar; these interferences are not directly related to intentional radio countermeasures). According to the nature of the impact, active radio interference is divided into masking and simulating (disorienting). Masking interference is created by chaotic, noise signals, among which it is difficult to distinguish the signals received from objects; imitating - signals similar to signals from objects, but containing false information. Active masking interference often takes the form of noise-modulated RF oscillations, or noise oscillations similar to the inherent noise of the radar receiver. Depending on the width of the frequency spectrum, they are divided into aiming, having a spectrum width commensurate with the bandwidth of the radar receiver, and barrage, "overlapping" a certain section of the radio frequency range. Active interference can also take the form of probing radar signals modulated in amplitude, frequency, phase, delay time or polarization (they are formed from probing signals received at the jamming station). Such interference is called reciprocal, it can be both imitating and masking.

Radio interference stations are placed on protected objects or outside them. Modern aircraft jamming stations have a power of ~ 10-103 W in continuous mode and an order of magnitude higher in pulsed mode; the maximum antenna gain is typically 10-20 dB. The power of ground and ship jamming stations is usually higher. To create passive interference, dipole, tape, corner and dielectric lens reflectors, antenna arrays, inflatable metallized balloons, etc. are used. On radar indicators (on certain sections of the cathode ray tube screen or across the entire screen), interference creates background noise or false marks of objects, which in greatly complicates the detection of objects, target distribution and their tracking. Influencing devices for automatic detection and tracking of objects, interference can cause overload of devices for automatic data processing, disruption of automatic tracking of objects, and introduce large errors in determining the location and motion parameters of objects.

Under these conditions, the struggle of radar systems among themselves, called radio countermeasures, naturally arises. An integral area of ​​radio countermeasures is the direction finding of active jammers.

Direction finding is the determination of the direction to any object through angular coordinates. The possibility of finding an object is determined by its contrast against the surrounding background (difference in the physical properties of the object and the background). There are passive direction finding, when the natural contrast of the direction finding object is used, and active direction finding, when the object is irradiated with electromagnetic or sound waves from an artificial emitter and the radiation reflected by it or retransmitted signals is observed (for example, direction finding using laser radiation sources).

Depending on the method of processing the received signals, direction finding methods are distinguished. In direction finding by the amplitude method, the spatial position of the radiation pattern of the transmitter or receiver antenna is changed. Determining the direction to the direction-finding object can be carried out by the maximum or minimum amplitude of the received signal, as well as by the method of comparison. When direction-finding by the phase method, reception is carried out on antennas spaced apart in space, stabilized in the main planes; the measured value is the phase difference of the signals received by the antennas, which depends on the angular coordinates of the object.

One of the negative phenomena in direction finding is a false alarm, the probability of which is estimated using a special parameter - the level of false alarms. As a rule, a decrease in the level of false alarms (probability of false alarms) leads to a decrease in the sensitivity of the direction finder. The solution of this contradiction is the main task of this work.

1. Description of the work of the prototype.

The amplitude direction finder for active jammers (Fig. 1) contains an antenna 1, a receiver 2, to which a detector-integrator 3, a memory block 4 and a gain averaging block 5 are connected, the outputs of blocks 4 and 5 are connected to a comparison device 6 connected in turn to the counting-deciding block 7.

To explain the principle of operation, diagrams of the output signals of the indicated blocks (with the exception of block 7) are used when scanning along the angular coordinate in a certain neighborhood of one active jammer (AJ) (Fig. 2).

At the output of antenna 1, there is a certain signal, which is a stationary Rayleigh random process with a sharp increase in the oscillation amplitude and frequency ordering at the moment of bearing (Fig. 2, a). The signal enters receiver 2, where the amplification and removal of the angular modulation takes place (Fig. 2, b).

Next, the signal passes through the detector-integrator 3, which builds the amplitude envelope (Fig. 2c). From the output of the detector-integrator 3, the signal enters the memory block 4, where it is stored at intervals t, much shorter time  rotation of the antenna for the entire width of the radiation pattern (Fig. 2, d), and in block 5 gain averaging, where for a certain period of time T, which includes t, and much larger  the average value of the voltage is formed. The presence of the gain averaging unit 5 makes it possible to reduce the probability of false alarms caused by random emissions of the radiation pattern. The signals from the memory block 4 and the gain averaging block 5 are compared with each other (Fig. 2, e) in the comparator 6, and when the signal from the memory block 4 exceeds the value of the signal from the gain averaging block 5, a signal is generated at the output of the comparator 6 the presence of a bearing (Fig. 2, f) in the form of a rectangular pulse, the middle of which corresponds to the exact moment of the bearing.

Figure 1 - Block diagram of the prototype.

a) U U U

Electronic interference is classified according to various criteria.

By origin, natural and artificial interference are distinguished. Natural - natural origin: atmospheric lightning discharges, reflections from meteorological formations (rain, snow, clouds), the earth's surface and others. Artificial - created by devices emitting EME or reflectors.

Depending on the sources of education, there are: intentional and unintentional interference.

By the nature of the impact on the RES: masking and simulating.

Masking interference reduces the signal-to-noise ratio in the operating frequency band. Imitating - introduce false information about the frequencies of the RES.

According to the intensity of impact on the RES: weak, medium and strong. (Loss of information, respectively, up to 15%, not less than 50%, more than 75%) and do not reduce, reduce and exclude the performance of combat missions by RES.

By the width of the spectrum and the accuracy of guidance: sighting and barrage.

According to the method of creation: active and passive. Active ones are created by the energy of interference sources, passive ones - by energy dissipation.

By the nature of the radiation: continuous and pulsed. In turn, pulse can be synchronous and non-synchronous, single and multiple. Continuous - noise and modulated.

Aviation electronic warfare equipment is an integral part of aviation on-board equipment and is designed to suppress the operation of all types of enemy radio electronic equipment. They are built-in base and additional jamming stations, anti-radar missiles, false targets and traps. Additional can be placed both in the fuselage and in hanging containers.

They are divided into means of creating active and passive radio interference, anti-radar missiles, decoys and traps Fig. 2 (draw).

Rice. 2. Classification of aircraft electronic warfare

Means of creating active jamming are divided into radar jamming stations, jamming stations for radio communications and radio data transmission lines, jamming stations for optoelectronic means, thrown (one-time) jamming transmitters Fig. 3 (draw).

Rice. 3. Classification of aviation means of creating active jamming

Group protection radar jamming stations are designed to protect a group of aircraft by suppressing radar stations (RLS) for detecting, targeting and guiding fighters. As a rule, they are installed on special electronic warfare aircraft or on strategic bombers. The equivalent power of group protection interference stations can be: in barrage mode - up to 500 W / MHz, in aiming mode - 2000 - 5000 W / MHz.

Personal protection radar jamming stations are designed for aircraft self-defense by suppressing missile-guided radars and the radar sight of a fighter-interceptor and are installed on every modern aircraft.

Radar jamming stations have the ability to set masking noise interference, under the influence of which the calculation cannot distinguish the target against their background, as well as imitating impulse interference. Simulating interference on the radar indicator screen looks like marks of the same targets. It is possible to set both types of interference at once.

On tactical aviation aircraft, the equivalent power of stations in terms of personal protection can be: in barrage mode - 10-30 W / MHz, in aiming mode - 200-500 W / MHz, and on strategic aviation aircraft 50-100 and 500-1000 W / MHz, respectively.

Interference stations for radio communications and radio data transmission lines are designed to suppress the command radio networks of the air defense system, which are used to control the fire of anti-aircraft missile battalions and guide fighter-interceptors. In this case, both speech and telecode information is distorted.

Interference stations for optical-electronic means are mainly designed to suppress thermal seeker of air-to-air missiles, as well as to disable the receivers of laser locators of fighters and laser rangefinders of anti-aircraft weapons.

Thrown jamming transmitters (ZPP) are designed to suppress the operation of the radio electronic equipment for the duration of an air defense system breakthrough and are capable of creating interference of any nature for 10–120 minutes. They can be delivered to areas of suppressed means by manned and unmanned aircraft, missiles, artillery shells, gliding (guided) bombs, balloons, reconnaissance and sabotage groups.

The means of creating passive interference are various automatic devices that throw out packs of dipole anti-radar reflectors (PRLO) in flight, as well as unguided rockets and air bombs stuffed with the same packs.

Aerial bombs with PRLO are used for group defense and are dropped from a high altitude by support aircraft. The PRLOs thrown out of the bomb at an altitude of 3-6 km form a screen for the radar that hides the aircraft of the strike group.

PRLO ejection machines are most often used to ensure the premature operation of the SAM radio fuse when it approaches the aircraft.

False targets are devices that imitate real objects in terms of reflective and other characteristics. Depending on the type and ranges of the waves used, false targets can be radar, light and acoustic. With the help of false targets, marks similar to marks of real objects are formed on the screens of reconnaissance electronic means (RES). This complicates the situation, disorients operators and target distribution systems, and increases the target recognition time. Radar decoys by design are a small unmanned aircraft or cruise missile and are used by strategic bombers (the B-52 has 20 SCAD decoys) and tactical aircraft (the F-15 has 12 Maxi-Decoy decoys).

Traps are technical means used to divert guided munitions from targets or disrupt automatic target tracking by radar stations. A radar trap operates effectively if, after its launch, the aircraft and the trap are not resolved by the radar in terms of range, angular coordinates and speed. It must move away from the object at such a speed that reliable withdrawal of the tracking strobes of automatic tracking systems is ensured. Traps for the removal of infrared (IR) GOS air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles (Stinger missiles) are most widely used.

The combat operations of tactical and carrier-based aviation in the theater of operations are intensively covered by interference from special group defense aircraft (EA-6V - primarily against early warning radars and fire control of anti-aircraft systems; EC-130H - against interceptor control radio links). Strikes are preceded by strikes by fire suppression aircraft of the radar of the enemy air defense system. The significance of these aircraft can be estimated at least by the fact that their number reaches 20-30 percent. the number of attack aircraft participating in the air operation. This allows the AN / ALQ-131 system of tactical fighters to limit the electronic warfare systems of individual protection with a detection receiver, an active jamming station and a device for setting passive ones, mainly to disrupt the aiming of guided weapons at them without spending electronic suppression resources on combating the means of detecting the enemy’s air defense system and fighter-interceptor control.

For bombers in a strategic air operation, the use of special electronic warfare aircraft and even collective defense are excluded.

Since 1972, the AN / ALQ-161 airborne defense system has been installed on all US bombers, which is constantly being improved.

Structurally, the AN / ALQ-161 complex consists of 108 removable and replaceable modules under airfield conditions (weighting an average of 20 kg and a volume of 30–200 dm 2), of which more than a third are antenna devices.

Its cost is 20 million dollars (10 percent of the cost of the bomber). In terms of mass-energy characteristics of its equipment, it surpasses the electronic warfare systems of EA-6V group defense jamming aircraft by 1.4 times, and the electronic warfare kits of tactical aviation personal protection (AN / ALQ-131) - by 9 times.

The complex produces, with an accuracy of 1 degree, direction finding of all types of ground-based radars at ranges exceeding their detection range. Recognizes the mode of operation (search, capture, guidance of missiles) and performs the optimal distribution of power and the setting of targeted active jamming of RES in accordance with their mode of operation.

Received the first electronic warfare aircraft Il-22PP "Chopper", created by the Experimental Machine-Building Plant named after. Myasishchev on the basis of the Il-18 aircraft, the United Aircraft Corporation reported. The latest complex is capable of selectively suppressing enemy electronics with the strongest interference, while maintaining the combat readiness of domestic military equipment.

On the completion of state tests of a prototype aircraft with a recommendation to accept it into service with the Russian Aerospace Forces, the director of the EMZ named after. Myasishcheva reported to the Minister of Defense during a single day of military acceptance on October 21, 2016, the report said.

In November 2016, it is planned to transfer two more production aircraft to the customer.

The equipment of the complex allows you to effectively deal with modern airborne early warning aircraft of the US Air Force AWACS type, radio equipment of Patriot air defense systems and jam the control channels of military drones.

The Il-22PP is also capable of conducting electronic reconnaissance and group protection of its aircraft from enemy electronic warfare systems.

All the advanced electronic filling of the Il-22PP aircraft was developed by enterprises and institutes that are part of the Radioelectronic Technologies concern (), Vladimir, adviser to the first deputy general director of KRET, told Gazeta.Ru.

“The combat capabilities of the Chopper far exceed anything that has been created in this area before. The Il-22PP has very good reconnaissance characteristics, these aircraft can operate as part of a group, and the equipment on board is the most modern - digital technology and phased antenna arrays.

As for the turboprop aircraft, on the basis of which the electronic warfare complex is located, the Americans still have S-130 aircraft in service, ”Mikheev explained.

The Il-20/Il-22 family of military aircraft was created on the basis of the Il-18 civilian turboprop airliner (codified by Coot - "Coot"), which began to be mass-produced in the USSR in the late 1950s. The IL-18 interested the military in its efficiency and ability to stay in the air for a long time.

On the Il-20 platform, several special-purpose vehicles were created. In particular, measuring complexes for testing missile technology, electronic intelligence aircraft and Il-22 air command posts.

There are several varieties of these machines. One of them is the Il-22M11, the latest version of the Russian air command post. The other is the modification of the Il-20M electronic intelligence aircraft under the Monitor and Anagram projects.

"Chopper" - the latest modification of this aircraft. This aircraft is equipped with the latest electronic warfare equipment, in particular side antennas and towed transmitters that unwind several hundred meters in flight.

When creating this electronic warfare system, some technical solutions were applied, thanks to which the Chopper had the ability to act exclusively on signals with a certain frequency, without affecting others.

Previously, electronic warfare systems of previous models during operation often suppressed the signals not only of enemy electronic systems, but also of their own means.

Before turning on the Chopper's active jamming system, it scans all available radio signals and finds the frequencies on which the enemy's transmitters operate, a KRET representative told Gazeta.Ru. At this time, the aircraft itself does not emit anything and the equipment operates exclusively in the receive mode. After detecting the most important communication channel of the enemy or the signal of an enemy radar station, equipment operators interfere in the required frequency range.

Several of these aircraft will be able to disrupt or even completely paralyze enemy airborne early warning aircraft, flying command posts, air defense systems, aircraft and drones over a large area.

Development work on the Cleaver project began as part of a government contract dated November 8, 2009, the deputy director told Gazeta.Ru.

“The Il-22P prototype (registration number RA-75903) began flight design tests in 2011, state joint tests began in 2014 and completed last year. The re-equipment of the second (first serial) Il-22PP aircraft was carried out by the Myasishchev plant under a 2012 contract (aircraft registration number - RF-90786). The re-equipment of the third (second serial) Il-22PP aircraft was carried out under a contract dated June 11, 2014. All three aircraft were converted from Il-22 air control posts.

Built in the late 1970s, the car was repaired and modernized before installing electronic warfare equipment. The most notable difference between the Il-22PP aircraft and the basic modification was several large fairings on the sides, inside of which the antennas are located.

The most modern concepts of war are inconceivable without the use of early warning aircraft and a variety of drones. And Il-22PP aircraft with the Chopper can become the main threat to a potential enemy, paralyzing its communication channels and detection systems.