Specialized plant for light alloys 1929 1941. Metallurgy of light alloys in Russia. Aluminum production at the Volkhov enterprise

Panorama of Setun village. 1932

During the years of the first five-year plans, in addition to the reconstruction of old, pre-revolutionary construction of enterprises, new ones were built on the territory of Kuntsevo. The largest new building in the prewar years was the construction of a light alloys plant, later the Institute of Light Alloys - VILS (All Union Institute of Light Alloys, 1961) was formed under it, it was under this name that the enterprise became widely known in our country and far beyond it. outside.

In the Russian Empire, there was no production of light alloys based on aluminum. The aluminum industry is one of the most energy intensive industries. The first aluminum smelter in the USSR (Volkhovsky) was launched on the basis of the Volkhovskaya hydroelectric power station (1932).

The plant of light alloys was designed by the Leningrad Gipromez from 1928, and in the fall of 1929 construction began. The construction site was deployed at the fork of the Usovskaya and Mozhaiskaya railway lines, in the former village of Nekrasovka, which was located near the village of Setun.

The design and construction of the plant was preceded by a lot of work on the development technological processes: melting and casting - engineer V. A. Butalov, methods of rolling and heat treatment - engineer Yu. G. Muzalevsky both carried out their work at the Kolchuginsky plant since 1921. N. M. Nadezhdin, S. S. Mironov, D. L. Averbakh, P. I. metallurgist of the Kolchuginsky plant G. A. Osetsimsky and foreman M. G. Zakharov.

At the same time, the experience of foreign firms was being studied. The leading countries in the aluminum industry at that time were the USA, Canada, France, and Germany. Our specialists visited BMW in Germany, Gnome and Ron in France. In 1929, an agreement was reached on the provision of technical assistance with the French Aluminum Society. The Americans categorically did not go into contacts with our country on aluminum technologies. One specialist, the American R. Anderson, agreed to take part in the design of the plant for a large reward. But as soon as he returned from Russia to the United States and began to collect the necessary materials, he was summoned by the head of the company where Anderson worked, and he was immediately fired. The head of the firm was also a minister of the US government, so our well-wisher found himself in a very uncomfortable position and did not come to the USSR again.

Simultaneously with the construction of the main buildings of the plant, the project was adjusted. The designers, starting work on the project, started from the existing domestic experience in casting and rolling aluminum alloys. At our plants, it was possible to roll ingots weighing 20–40 kg, while the yield of suitable sheet metal was 15–20%. Foreigners have already rolled ingots of 40–50 kg.

Our specialists convinced the designers to include in the project the rolling of ingots weighing from 80 kg with the possibility of further increasing the weight to

- 124 -

300–500 kg. To heat the ingots, electric heating was introduced, instead of oil furnaces, multi-roll furnaces were introduced. rolling mills other innovative proposals were also introduced into the project, which subsequently fully justified themselves. After the adjustments made to the project, the project examination showed that in terms of production volumes, aluminum processing at the plant can surpass the production volumes of all European plants - such a giant.

The construction of the plant was carried out by contract. Draft and final designs were carried out first by Gipromez, and then by the Leningrad branch of Giprotsvetmet, working drawings - by Gosproektstroy. Construction work was carried out by various trusts. This way of doing things has a significant drawback, namely, it divides a single goal into the interests of separate groups with their own narrow interests. To top it off, an endless series of changes in construction management began (for example, within 6 months, construction management changed three times), and at the moment when it was necessary to develop a project for the organization construction works and start implementing it.

The construction department of the management instructed the engineers S. A. Yampolsky and V. P. Zapolsky to lead the coordination of work, expanding the scope of the functions formally assigned to them. This measure made it possible to concentrate design and construction work under a single management.

The principal building design guidelines were as follows:

a) Possible simplification of work and, as a result, their reduction in cost and the possibility of using low-skilled workers. These installations were of great importance, given the difficulty in recruiting skilled labor in the face of the enormous scale of construction that unfolded throughout the Soviet Union in accordance with the 1st Five-Year Plan.

This problem was solved by standardizing the types and main dimensions of buildings, which made it possible to achieve uniformity in structures, organize mass procurement of the main elements of these structures and increase the use of various auxiliary devices and devices that have a large specific gravity in total cost works.

It suffices to point out that the multiple use of formwork during reinforced concrete work has given a great economic effect and savings in scarce materials.

b) Maximum use of less scarce building materials.

From this point of view, the replacement of iron as the main building material, tree. Wood is almost the only material for floors, the use of reinforced concrete floors only in places of fire zones, the use for the first time in the Union of segment forms made of wood of high humidity and ordinary commercial quality, laying brick walls on a warm mortar, which reduced the consumption of bricks, use as a heat-insulating fiberboard material, made mainly from waste in the form of shavings, the absence of frame structures that cause an increased consumption of cement and iron - that's characteristics buildings and structures built in 1930.

The floors of the Shukhov-Brod systems used for the construction of the mechanical repair shop and the main store made it possible to use the most running wood, and the floors of wooden nail beams for the garage, metal warehouse and door shop made it possible to use cuttings of forest materials obtained during the construction of large objects. These new designs, which solved the problem of alleviating the shortage of building materials, were a moment of healthy production risk, which should have taken place with the then grandiose scale of construction.

c) The simplicity of the structures and architectural forms of the buildings, in accordance with their intended purpose, the observance of the most advantageous dimensions of the buildings in the plan, were indispensable conditions for the builders of the plant.

d) Construction calendar plan construction in accordance with the sequence of commissioning of the main and auxiliary workshops, which helped to avoid the construction of a number of temporary structures and ensure the normal course of subsequent work on the development of production.

Guided by this principle, the construction management put into operation the first premises of the warehouse, the mechanical repair shop, the central laboratory, the plant management, the FZO, several residential buildings, the construction of MOGES, water supply and a boiler house. Of the production workshops, the foundry was the first to be put into operation.

e) Timely execution of those works that could affect the pace and cost of construction, such as: site planning, construction of permanent roads, construction of permanent railway tracks and water lines. All this was supposed to bring construction to a higher technical level and ensure a reduction in the cost of construction and its accelerated pace.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to carry out this fundamental installation in full, but a significant part of this type of work was completed in a timely manner.

With frequent changes in the management of our contractor, the implementation of this extremely important principle is due solely to the energy of the then leaders of the construction department, Comrade. Yampolsky and Zapolsky.

In the first season of the main construction work (spring-summer-autumn 1930), the buildings of all the main and auxiliary shops were completed by November and prepared for the full deployment of foundation work. The seasons of 1931, as well as 1932, were spent on the production of all kinds of special works, of which a significant percentage fell on the construction of foundations for the main and auxiliary equipment. In 1932, the actual construction work is sharply reduced and the assemblers for the installation of mechanical and power equipment play a predominant role.

The first project of Gipromez could not meet the requirements of new technology, without which the construction of an enterprise of such a large scale as Plant No. 95 was unthinkable.

French technical assistance could not contribute anything new to the creation of new technology.

The plant at that time was a huge enterprise, the likes of which Europe did not have, and the United States had only a few examples that were in a special account and served as a source of special pride.

Our large-scale installations aroused surprise abroad, and sometimes even outright distrust at the seriousness. Many doubted the reality of the intended production volume.

Criticism of the project at home and abroad boiled down to the following main points:

1. First of all, Soviet experts considered it risky to base the calculations of the rolling shop on ingots weighing 80 kg and strongly recommended to stop on ingots weighing 40–50 kg, which at that time were operated by foreign and our plants (the latter used ingots weighing 20–40 kg).

2. From here, the capacity of the mill of the Shlomani trio company, which we chose, was taken into question, especially since, when choosing the mill, we determined the need for the company to calculate the design of the mill for a possible increase in the weight of the ingot in the future up to 300–500 kg.

Based on the weight of an ingot of 40–50 kg, the examination recommended reducing the capacity of the mill by a factor of 2 and replacing one with two mills that are significantly smaller in capacity.

2. 3. The lack of verification of the advantages of electric smelting in the production of a foundry, which was doubted by the French expertise.

3. 4. Both examinations (both Soviet and French) cast doubt on the technical and economic advantage of using direct current (variable speeds and powers) for hot and cold rolling and drawing.

It was recommended to confine ourselves to the use of alternating current, as it does not require large investments in equipment, and the possibility of changing the speeds within 1–3, which we designed, was considered completely unnecessary.

1. 5. The use of multi-roll mills, in particular 6-roll mills, which at that time were novelties not only in our country, but also abroad, although it did not cause any particular objections, they refused any specific point of view and recommendations of the examination, citing ignorance of this type of ore.

2. 6. The possibility of using high speeds in rolling and drawing was recognized by the examination as unclear.

3.7. A certain doubt was expressed in the technical and economic payback of fully electrified and mechanized metal heat treatment operations.

4. 8. The general and very sharp reduction in the path of the technological process, the reduction in the number of production operations (rolling, drawing and annealing) also raised doubts.

From this list of main issues, which were the subject of either differences in views on the fundamental basis of the project between experts and projects, or doubts in the examination of the technical and economic feasibility of existing types of equipment or energy, it can be seen that the final design of the plant differed sharply from the technology that existed at that time. at Soviet and foreign factories.

The following fundamentally new points were laid by us as the basis of the final project:

1. 1. Melting in large electric resistance furnaces with a capacity of 1.5–2 tons instead of melting in crucibles with a capacity of 40–50 kg.

2. 2. Consolidation of ingots for rolling by at least 2 times for the first period of the plant operation with the possibility of its further increase.

3. 3. The use of direct current for hot rolling and drawing presses, with the possibility of changing speeds within 1–3.

4. 4. The use of a powerful mill, which makes it possible to sharply increase productivity in hot rolling with the possibility of an even sharper increase in the future due to the enlargement of ingots.

5. 5. Application of 6-roll mills with roller bearings for cold rolling of strips in rolls 500 mm wide and sheets 1000 mm wide with the possibility of subsequent adaptation of sheet mills for rolling wide strips. The designed schemes of reductions and the number of cold rolling were 3–5 times higher than the scheme adopted at that time on mills equipped with plain bearings.

1. 6. Order for horizontal presses for direct and reverse pressing methods.

2. 7. Complete electrification of all heat treatment processes (heating before hot rolling and pressing, annealing and hardening).

3. 8. Rejection of saltpeter and water during hardening of sheet products and tapes in rolls.

4. 9. Creation of a first-class central laboratory in terms of equipment and variety of testing methods.

In addition, in a general note to the project of the plant as a whole, a forecast was made on the importance of forging products made of light alloys in national economic tasks, especially for aviation and transport. This forecast was considered necessary, since the task for designing the forge shop was not received due to the lack of demand for light alloy products manufactured by it, and US practice indicated the extremely wide use of the latter in all areas of industry and technology.

At the same time, considerations were given on the need to organize the production of extruded profiles, which at that time began to find wide application in Europe and especially in the USA.

These were the main points that served as a new characteristic and fundamental basis for the project.

The novelty and lack of knowledge of the designed technological processes distinguished it from the generally accepted practice of our and foreign non-ferrous metal processing plants. In this sense, the designers had to bear responsibility, since the critics of the examination limited themselves to a warning, without insisting on a revision of the project, and it was accepted for implementation without any changes.

Already the initial period of the work of the plant made it possible to draw conclusions on the main questions that were the subject of dispute both in our technical circles and in the judgments of the French consultation.

The most important conclusions were:

1. 1. Electric smelting in the type of furnaces we have chosen, which met with especially vigorous condemnation from the French, practically justified itself both in terms of the quality of the produced metal and in terms of productivity.

2. 2. The rolling of large ingots, an issue that at one time caused especially sharp disagreements, was successfully carried out, and the capacity of the head hundred sodium, as well as 6 cold rolling mills, fully justified itself.

If we had listened to the examination at that time, recognized the impossibility of basing design calculations for 80 kg of an ingot and would have bought two stanatrios of significantly lower power and, in total, much more expensive, then this would have looked like a major and irreparable mistake.

Our standard ingot already in the first year of operation of the plant exceeded the projected one by 25% (100 kg instead of 80).

Our hot rolling mill, which immediately proved itself to be a plant that is harmonious in all parts, allows us today to increase the weight of the ingot by 2–3 times and thereby ensure a sharp increase in our productivity. Thus, this most valuable unit has not become obsolete even now and, obviously, will not become obsolete for many years to come.

So it's absolutely correct. Chief Engineer B.P. Rolshchikov put it this way: “Now the whole story of doubts, objections, surprises, well-desired and simply not commendable attempts to prevent the installation of such a mill looks strange.”

During the years of the Great Patriotic War Plant No. 95 was evacuated to Verkhnyaya Salda. In the postwar period, the Institute of Light Alloys was organized at the plant with technological and design departments, metallurgical laboratories, which made it possible to comprehensively address the issues of new technologies. Institute and factory contributed

a great contribution to equipping the aviation industry, rocket technology and other branches of the defense industry with the necessary materials and products. In the pre-perestroika years, VILS was equipped with a permanent branch exhibition, where the latest achievements in science and technology were demonstrated. VILS became the center of scientific and technical information about the achievements of the MAP in the USSR.

An invaluable contribution to the metallurgy of light and special alloys was made by scientists and employees of VILS under the guidance of its creator, Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of State Prizes Alexander Fedorovich Belov. Under his leadership and with direct participation, sheathing foxes were created.

for aviation, cold rolling has been mastered, and special equipment has been created for processing aluminum alloys. VILS scientists made a great contribution to the development of the scientific foundations of an innovative technological system. VILS was the founder of the creation of aluminum alloys alloyed with lithium, scandium, titanium and nickel alloys, scientific discoveries of the patterns of crystallization of metallic materials and many other technological breakthroughs based on science.

The activities of VILS and its leader A.F. Belov, in terms of the sum of scientific and engineering achievements in the field of light alloys, are comparable to the progress in ferrous metallurgy, achieved thanks to the brilliant discoveries of Dmitry Konstantinovich Chernov (1839–1921).

Requisites

Decree No. 158 / ss STO of the USSR "On the aviation industry"

Top secret.

To state that the government decrees of March 5, 1930, September 5, 1930 and January 11, 1931 regarding the development of the aviation industry are clearly being implemented unsatisfactorily. In the special quarter of 1930 and the first half of 1931, plans for both construction and production were actually frustrated. Reconstruction of old, planning and deployment of new plants are in a completely unsatisfactory state.

To state that the aviation industry, transferred in July 1930 to the NKVM for the purpose of improving it, where it was located until March 1931, in fact did not achieve any improvement, but, on the contrary, went down, which created the need for its reverse transfer under the authority of the Supreme Economic Council.

In the development of these government resolutions, the Labor and Defense Council decides:

I. Pilot construction

1. Propose to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR and the Revolutionary Military Council to pay special attention to experimental aircraft construction and to ensure all the necessary conditions for the deployment of experienced organizations to a size that fully ensures the accepted pace and scale of aviation development.

2. Organize the work of experimental organizations based on the concentration of scientific and design forces, the attraction and use of foreign technical assistance, a thorough study of the best models of aircraft and engines so that the problem of "catching up and overtaking" is resolved within the next 2-3 years and samples are created aircraft and engines, weapons and equipment (machine guns, cannons, sights, photos, radios) that surpass the best examples of foreign technology.

3. Make it the duty of experimental organizations to develop detailed and thorough development of all technological issues of introduction and launch of prototypes in a series, rationalization of mass production. The institutes must be the leading principle in the technical reconstruction of the aviation industry.

In the field of organization of production, it is proposed to the Higher Administrative District that the main task be to switch over as soon as possible to mechanized production, the use of stamping, welding and other methods of mass production of parts and their assembly.

4. To oblige the HLW, resolutely suppressing the attempts of individual comrades to turn pilot production into an end in itself, to take the main aim of the speedy implementation in mass production built and tested samples of aircraft and engines as its first priority (within no more than 6-8 months).

5. To oblige TsAGI and IAM¹* to focus on the development of technology issues for the materials used in the aircraft industry, for which purpose create powerful technological departments under them.

6. Propose to the HLW to design and manufacture heavy and super-heavy metal aircraft with the greatest possible use of steel and a reduction in aluminum, and light aircraft - mainly of mixed construction (steel, wood, canvas).

7. Propose to the Higher Administrative District to speed up the work on the creation of heavy fuel diesel engines, with the wide involvement of foreign technical assistance and the study of foreign samples.

To propose to the HLW to build by November 1, according to the available drawings, 5 heavy fuel diesel engines with a capacity of 230 HP. Along with this, special attention should be paid to solving the problem of stopping the motor at a distance.

8. To oblige the head of the VAO to speed up the construction of prototypes of low-power aircraft and engines and already in 1932 to deliver mass production in existing factories.

9. To oblige IAM to widely expand practical experimental work on electronic casting of crankcases and other engine assemblies and to produce two experimental M-34 electronic crankcases no later than October 1, 1931, using to the full the experience of the German company BMW and the experience of the Italian company Isota Fraschini".

10. To oblige the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR represented by the Teplobeton, Gossantekhstroy, Moskomgaz, VEO and other trusts, under the responsibility of the chairmen of these trusts and associations, to complete capital construction and equipment of experienced organizations within the stipulated time frame.

11. Oblige the NKVT to deliver to the Union the equipment ordered for the IAM at the request of 1929/30 and the special quarter no later than October 1, 1931.

12. To oblige the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR to fully provide orders from research institutes for the equipment of laboratories and the IAM plant with transport devices, cranes, compressor units and others of Soviet production no later than November 1, 1931.

13. To oblige the head of the VAO, Soyuzstankoinstrument, Orgmetal and associations of the USSR Supreme Economic Council, under the responsibility of the chairmen of these associations, to satisfy applications for tools, materials and equipment for urgent experimental work on pilot construction of the VAO, UVVS, VOGVF out of turn, and the Izhevsk, Motovilikhinsky and Elektrostal to supply forgings for experimental motors within a period not exceeding two months from the date they receive the drawings.

14. To release an additional contingent of 250 thousand rubles for the Supreme Council of National Economy. for the purchase of special machine tools and laboratory equipment to create a powerful technological department at IAM. Oblige the USSR Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to purchase and deliver equipment for this amount to the Union no later than December 1, 1931.

15. Open the Supreme Economic Council for IAM additional free contingent for 50 thousand rubles. for urgent purchases abroad of certain materials, equipment, units for experimental laboratories and experimental engine building.

16. To oblige the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to immediately begin negotiations on the purchase abroad of three experimental most advanced and powerful samples of gasoline and 4 samples of oil engines for studying their designs at the IAM and report to the STO about the required additional issue of currency within a month and a half. By October 1, 1931, invite 2 design teams, each with 5 people, and, in addition, 10 engineers, foremen and technicians for the IAM pilot plant.

17. To oblige the head of the VAO no later than August 1, 1931 to send engineers (including one for electronic casting) from IAM to Italy to the Izota Fraschini plant for the entire time of acceptance of the ASSO motors ordered by us for a detailed study of the experience of this company, especially in electronic casting, and in addition, in August and September, 8 more engineers and 4 foremen to factories in Europe and America to complete the targets related to the plan for the pilot construction of aircraft engines.

18. To oblige the NKVM, VOGVF and VAO within a month to develop and submit for approval by the Council of Labor and Defense a plan for the pilot construction of aircraft and engines, bearing in mind the introduction of strict specialization of engines by factories, and the types of engines should be common for the Air Force and civil aviation.

II. For foreign technical assistance

In order to ensure the implementation of the planned plan for aviation construction and exemption from foreign dependence on technical supply, starting from 1933 (excluding aluminum), it is necessary to consider it necessary to attract foreign technical assistance, for which purpose it is obligatory for the VAO to conclude contracts with foreign American and European firms for the following facilities with submission for government approval .

A. Tool economy

For technical assistance in setting up the production of all types of tools for the entire aviation industry with relevant foreign firms (Germany, Italy, England).

B. Split wings

Purchase from the English company "X. Page" license for split wings.

B. Through chrome-molybdenum pipes

To provide technical assistance in setting up the production of chromium-molybdenum pipes with one of the foreign companies (England, Sweden).

G. By piston rings

To provide technical assistance for the production of piston rings for aircraft engines with one of the foreign companies (Italy, Germany, America, etc.).

D. Aluminum Foundry

With the American firm "American Aluminum Company" for technical assistance in casting, forging, stamping and heat treatment of non-ferrous light and ultra-light alloys, as well as casting of impellers, forging and stamping of metal propellers. When concluding an agreement, provide for the provision of technical assistance both in the design, construction and selection of foundry equipment, as well as in the development of technological processes, selection of foundry soils, specification of materials, etc.

If an agreement with the American Aluminum Company does not take place, an agreement should be concluded with Curtis Wright or Bon Aluminum Company or with one of the European companies (Italy, Germany).

E. For the manufacture of special products and parts

With the American company Veidiks to launch the production of Stromberg-type carburetors, Eclipse self-starters, electromechanical and electric-inertial types, and brake wheels.

G. For machining and manufacturing of screws

With the American company "Hamilton" for technical assistance in machining and manufacturing screws from forgings (steel for bushings and duralumin for blades).

3. Valve production

With the American firm "Thomson" for technical assistance and setting up the production of valves for aircraft engines.

I. For the production of bearings

With the American firm "Addlison" for technical assistance and setting up the production of bearings²*.

K. On motor building

1. With the American company Curtis Wright to provide technical assistance in the design, construction and equipment of two engine-building plants, one for 10 thousand powerful water-cooled motors of the Curtis Conqueror type and another for 10 thousand low-power air-cooled motors of the Wright J type -6" 166 l. with. and its modifications and 5 thousand powerful air-cooled motors of the Wright-Cyclone type.

2. Acquire a license for the above Curtis Conqueror and Wright motors in all its types.

When concluding contracts, take into account the need to ensure not only the receipt of technical assistance on existing designs and manufacturing methods, but also on the development of designs and methods. At the same time, when concluding contracts, do not link the receipt of technical assistance and the acquisition of licenses with the purchase of equipment from these forms, focusing primarily on domestic engineering.

The acquisition of technical assistance must be associated with the maximum strengthening of the positions of our own pilot construction. In particular, it is necessary to obtain from the firms with which we will conclude contracts the right to use the experience and knowledge in the field of research laboratories, study the methodology, purchase special equipment and installations and involve employees of these laboratories to manage individual topics in our laboratories.

Considering it necessary to save as much as possible in spending foreign currency, instruct the commission, consisting of Comrade Pavlunovsky, Rozengolts (with the right to replace at his direction), Baranov, Kaganovich, Alksnis, Holtzman, Guy and Goryanov, to review all requirements for foreign currency, equipment and technical assistance, with research all possibilities to be based on production and technology within the USSR. The convocation of the commission is up to Comrade Pavlunovsky. Upon a unanimous decision of the commission, proceed to the conclusion of contracts. The term of the commission is monthly.

Consider and submit urgent contracts within a ten-day period. Permit immediately to start concluding a contract with American firms for technical assistance in aluminum casting, forging and stamping up to a currency amount of 1 million dollars.

III. On the implementation of the construction plan and the program of 1931

1. Approve the production program for the aviation industry in 1931 for aircraft: R-5 - 680, TB-1 - 146, R-6 - 50, fighters - 376, TB-3 - 3, U-2 (training) - 809, S-62 bis ("Savoye") - 30, TSh-7 (assault) - 10, ANT-9 - 114, K-5 - 205, U-1 - 105, R-1 - 302, AP-2 - 55 , P-1 - 15, [total] - 2900, including Air Force - 2024; by motors: M‑17 - 900, M‑22 - 281, M‑11 - 971, M‑15 - 430, M‑27 - 150, M‑26 - 410, M‑19 - 10, M‑34 - 8 , YuUN - 10, [total] - 3170, including the Air Force - 2090.

3. In order to provide the HLW plants with equipment in a timely manner for the implementation of the large program of 1932: a) the commission of Comrade Pavlunovsky to consider and report to the STO within a decade the issue of increasing the import contingent of the Supreme Economic Council in 1931 by 6.5 million rubles. for the purchase of equipment for the factories of the Aviation Industry; b) to oblige the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade to place all orders for equipment for the aviation industry in the shortest possible time in accordance with all appropriations for 1931; c) to oblige the Supreme Council of National Economy to fully place all the equipment required for the aviation industry in 1931 at the factories of the Union.

4. To ensure the program of 1931, take the following measures: a) oblige the VAO to send abroad the necessary number of employees to learn the experience of foreign firms, and first of all: at plant No. 24 - 8 engineers, 8 foremen, 8 workers; for plant No. 26 - 6 engineers, 4 foremen to Germany for the BMW plant in accordance with the current agreement for technical assistance and a license; Plant No. 29 - 10 engineers and 10 foremen to France to the Gnome and Ron plant under the current contract for technical assistance and a license; b) oblige the VAO to recruit 45 engineers and 200 foremen and workers abroad; c) to oblige the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR to ensure the supply of plant No. 26 in July of this year. g. 200 tons of fireclay and in the future, starting from August this year. g., 50 tons per month.

5. The reconstruction of old factories and new construction should be based on strict technical specialization, the introduction of the latest advanced processing methods, as well as the attraction and use of foreign technical assistance.

6. In terms of the development of the aviation industry, to provide for the mass production of low-power aircraft and engines.

7. Propose to the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR to carry out constant and systematic guidance and control over the development of capital construction in the aviation industry and to provide the latter with everything necessary for the fulfillment of the plan within the precisely indicated time frame.

8. Create a powerful design department under the Capital Construction Department of the Eastern Administrative District.

9. To oblige the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy to allocate special construction offices on the ground for the construction of the HLW.

10. Attribute the capital construction of the aircraft industry to the group of shock construction under special supervision of the Supreme Council of National Economy.

11. To oblige Comrade Ivanov Soyuzstroy to ensure the timely execution of projects and drawings for the construction work of the HLW.

13. In view of the involvement of a large number of specialists, including foreign ones, to oblige the Moscow Council no later than January 1, 1932 to provide the VAO with 75 apartments and the VOGVF with 25 apartments.

For Plant No. 39. To oblige the Supreme Economic Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to produce 20 aircraft (interceptors) and 6 heavy bombers TB-5 during 1931.

V. Personnel

1. The rapid growth of the aviation industry during the period 1931-1934. will require special attention to the training of personnel. The available quantities of skilled labor, engineering and technical personnel and the existing network of educational institutions of the Aviation Association do not ensure the implementation of the aircraft industry development plan.

2. To propose to the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR to strengthen the apparatus of the Higher Administrative District and the leadership of the aircraft industry plants.

3. The personnel department of the Supreme Council of National Economy and the head of the Higher Administrative District should pay special attention to the selection of directors of aviation industry enterprises.

4. To oblige the VAO in the control figures for 1932 to provide funds for the improvement of cultural, living and living conditions.

5. To oblige NKSnab, together with the VAO, to outline concrete measures for a radical improvement in the supply of workers in the aviation industry within two decades and submit for approval to the Council of People's Commissars.

6. In order to provide the production program of 1931 with a qualified workforce, offer the HLW: a) from among the students 17 thousand people. workers to ensure the release in the current year of at least 6 thousand people. In addition, to immediately expand the training of workers of average qualification in the current year to produce at least 4 thousand people, including 1 thousand people. without interruption from production; b) to transfer from the Moscow aircraft factories the necessary number of skilled workers (coppers, turners and millers) to plant No. 39 to ensure that a special task is completed within the prescribed time.

7. Within a month, transfer skilled workers from other industries (4-7 category): a) for plant No. 26 - oblige Comrade Kolotilov to transfer at least 800 people. The Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR to transfer to the jurisdiction of plant No. 26 in Rybinsk the former plant. "Metalist" them. Berries with all equipment and personnel; b) for plant number 29 - to oblige comrade Kosior S. transfer at least 250 people, as well as transfer the Zaporozhye Mechanical Plant (former Katsena), which is under conservation, to the jurisdiction of plant No. 29 for personnel training; c) for plant number 24 - oblige comrade Ryndin to transfer 200 people.

8. To oblige the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR to allocate, first of all, 630 machine tools for the HLW from the funds of machine tools intended for the schools of the FZU.

9. Oblige the HLW and the current year to deploy additional training workforce for newly built plants in the amount of 16 thousand people, including 9.5 thousand people at the bases of the Center for Newly Built Plants.

Secretary of the Council of Labor and Defense I. Miroshnikov

Notes:

1 * Institute of Aviation Motors (IAM) created by the decision of the Revolutionary Military Council on December 3, 1930. By order of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR on July 29, 1932, it was renamed the Central Institute of Aviation Motors (CIAM). He was engaged in the design and development of samples of aircraft engines and their units.

2 * Conclude an agreement with Adlison in the event that an agreement is not concluded with Bon Aluminum Company for the provision of technical assistance and the establishment of the production of aluminum castings and bearings ( Note. dock.).

3 * In the certificate of the NC RCT on implementation of the SRT resolutionUSSR dated July 25, 1931, it was indicated that as of December 1, 1931, the following had been done: I. As regards pilot construction: paragraphs 1, 11, 12 and 17 were not fulfilled; Items 14 and 18 are partially implemented; items 13, 15 and 16 are carried out with a delay. Point 2: Achievements at the Institute of Aircraft Motors were noted - work on the M-34 engine was successfully completed, satisfactory results were noted in the field of research and application of new aircraft alloys. The item on attracting foreign aid is being fulfilled unsatisfactorily. Item 3: engine building - “at the IAM it was created special department serial production, a regulation on its work and the procedure for introducing prototypes into a series has been developed, the study of the Giprospetsmet method for designing technological processes and equipment for serial production plants has begun. Aircraft building, a special department of TsAGI for the introduction of prototypes into mass production, is not working at the proper pace due to the lack of sufficiently qualified engineers. Point 4: IAM distributed its experimental motors to serial production plants, taking into account their production capabilities and experience. However, there is no complete correlation for aircraft: the ANT-14 of the 1930 release has not been fully tested until this moment and has not been included in the mass production of 1932. Point 5: the process of creating a technological department has been activated in the IAM; TsAGI carried out extensive work on chromium-molybdenum pipes. Item 6: TSh and TB-4 aircraft of steel structure were designed; for 1932, heavy aircraft TB-3, TB-1, ANT-9 were included in mass production. Item 7: IAM has established an oil department, where experiments are being carried out with single-cylinder installations, work has begun on the design of diesel engines. However, in terms of attracting foreign technical assistance for the construction of 5 diesel engines and on the issues of stopping the engine in the air, the decision was not implemented. Point 8: tests were successfully carried out and serial production of the 65 HP motor was started. TsAGI designed and will build in 1932 2 low-power aircraft, but the mass production of low-power aircraft is not on the agenda. Item 9 is fully implemented. Point 10: the capital construction of experimental organizations is going unsatisfactorily; The Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council did not give any special instructions and did not control the implementation of this decision by the trusts and associations. II. For foreign technical assistance: The WAO developed a plan for the implementation of the resolution on attracting foreign technical assistance and presented an estimate. However, the foreign department of the Supreme Economic Council did not arrange business trips and did not transfer the necessary funds. All items in this section have not been completed. III. On the implementation of the construction plan and the program of 1931: only items 4 “c”, 5, 8, 11 and 12 were completed. V. On personnel: items 6 “b”, 7 “c”, 8, 11-14, 17, 18. Sections VI-VIII are fully implemented. (GA RF. F. R-8418. Op. 5. D. 163. L. 123-136).

GA RF. F. R-8418. Op. 5. D. 62. L. 3-16. Certified copy.